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Introduction and motivation
After many decades of empirical research, there is no doubt that education is, on average, a profitable investment. A general agreement exists that besides being profitable, education is also a risky investment. At least two possible sources of risk can be found. First, a priori individuals may not be able to evaluate if their abilities will suffice to successfully complete the chosen level of education. And second, even if the educational process is completed successfully, they do not know where in the earnings distribution they will end up. In this paper we study the effect that this second source of risk (earnings uncertainty) exerts on wages. To the extent that the individual cannot ensure his/her returns to schooling and the variance of earnings is not constant across education, the risk premium in wages becomes as important as the average returns. While the latter has been widely studied, the risk premium has received little attention. Even though risk has been accounted for in several theoretical models, it has rarely been tested in an empirical context. Theory suggests that if risks are foreseeable they should be compensated for. The small empirical evidence on this subject confirms this theory 1 . Moreover, Hartog and Vijverberg (2002) claim that individuals display preference for a skewed earnings distribution, since they appreciate the low probabilities to obtain substantial incomes. Thus, in addition to testing the existence of risk compensation in wages, we also try to find evidence for what they call skewness "affection".
Previous works dealing with risk compensation in wages have estimated risk as the variance in earnings by occupation cells. Skewness is measured in a similar way. In an attempt to assess risk compensation in wages more accurately, Hartog and Vijverberg (2002) used occupation-education level cells. In this paper we are able to measure the risk and skewness of the earnings associated with the type of education only. We use a variable containing a detailed description of the highest educational level reached by Danes. We consider that a risk measure based only on education cells is closer to the true risk associated with the schooling investment. When the investment decision is made, individuals do not know their future occupation, only their education. With observations by schooling type, there is no problem of selective mobility that besets observations by occupation as used by Hartog and Vijverberg (2002) to generate sufficient observations on risk. Thus, our data base 1 King (1974) , Feinberg (1981) , McGoldrick (1995) , and Hartog, Plug, Diaz-Serrano and Vieira (2003) .
2 constitutes by itself a substantial improvement over previous empirical literature. We allow for the fact that within a given schooling level, both returns and risk may vary across educational types. For example, it is plausible that earnings distributions within the fields of Economics and Law, which attract more students, differ from those in for instance
Engineering.
Taking as baseline the work in Hartog and Vijberberg (2002) , in this paper we attempt to provide new empirical evidence on risk compensation in wages using Danish data. In contrast to previous literature dealing with this subject that reports evidence mainly based on cross-section data, we use a panel consisting of a 10 percent sample of the whole Danish population aged 16 and above observed during 17 years (about 500,000 observations per year). Using such a big panel allows us to separate permanent from transitory shocks in earnings, and to test if risks arising from both types of shocks are compensated for and in what manner. At the same time, our dataset also allows to experiment with new measures of risk based on earnings mobility. Thus, our contribution is not only based on the use of a wide range of educational types in measuring risk, but also on introducing a new dynamic dimension in the estimation of risk compensating differentials. Our results confirm the existence of such compensation in wages. With the aims described above, the remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we review the existing literature dealing with risk, education and wages. In section 3 we develop a simple model on risk compensating differentials. Section 4 provides a detailed description of the data used throughout this paper. Section 5 describes the risk measures used and reports the empirical results. Finally, section 6 presents a discussion on the main implications of our empirical results and concludes.
Previous literature
In the economic literature, earnings uncertainty (hereafter risk) has received considerable attention. Three different approaches have been proposed. The first and most widely used approach focuses on the effect of risk on human capital investment decisions. In their seminal work Levhari and Weiss (1974) use a two-period model of educational choice and find that earnings risk acts as a disincentive on the investment in human capital. Applying also a two-period model, Eaton and Rosen (1980) analytically confirm the results by Levhari and Weiss, while Kodde (1986) rejects them empirically by observing the contrary effect. Using a dynamic programming framework, Williams (1979) obtains that higher risk reduces the investment in human capital. Just the opposite conclusion is found by Hogan and Walker (2001) and Belzil and Hansen (2002) . Hartog and Diaz-Serrano (2002) also analyse the effect of stochastic post-school earnings on the optimal educational length.
Their theoretical model predicts that increasing risk in future income should exert a negative effect on the individual's educational length for risk-averse individuals and positive for "risk-lovers". These forecasts are validated by empirical findings using Spanish data.
The second approach establishes a link between the returns to schooling, as commonly defined in the Mincerian earnings equations, and risk. Low and Ormiston (1991) The third approach, in which the present work can be inserted, deals with risk compensation in wages. Although the literature on this subject is scarce and mainly focused on the US labour market, the empirical results are very consistent. Weiss (1972) was the first to consider the variance of earnings by educational levels and to correct the estimated rates of returns to schooling for different degrees of risk aversion. In a paper by King (1974) (2003) obtain the same result for The Netherlands, Germany, Spain and Portugal.
Our point of departure is the research on risk compensating differentials developed by Hartog and Vijverberg (2002) , who support the empirical findings with a formal theoretical model. They test risk compensation and skewness affection in wages for the US labour market using a wide variety of measures derived from their theoretical model 3 by using both reduced form and structural earnings equations. Christiansen and Nielsen (2002) analyse the risk-premium in wages using a Mean-Variance type of model, and thus establish a link between human capital and finance literature. They employ very detailed data on education (the same used here), which allows them to base the risk measure only on educational levels (110 cells). Using 11 years of Danish panel data, the authors find a positive and significant effect of risk on wages. However, they do not account for skewness affection, which is crucial in assessing the magnitude and the sign of the risk-premium. Using cross-country data, Pereira and Martins (2002) establish a positive link between risk as measured from quantile regressions and returns to education.
Conceptual framework
Our framework is similar to that presented in Hartog and Vijverberg (2002) . Individuals face several schooling options and will only undertake them if they are sufficiently compensated. The basic Mincer earnings function allows for compensation for earnings postponement, under strict assumptions implying a constant mark-up for every additional year of schooling. In our approach we allow for the fact that individuals considering an education generally do not face some fixed income after completing a certain education.
Instead they face an entire income distribution depending on the exact education which has been chosen. Thus, investing in schooling is a risky venture as an individual simply does not know where in this distribution she will end up. Risk averse individuals will want compensation for this risk. This risk premium will emanate from market supply reactions to the wage differential for options differing in earnings risk. Insufficient risk compensation will reduce supply of labour with that education and push up the wage, until equilibrium is established.
To be more specific, assume individuals can choose between educations, equal in length, intrinsic attractiveness, etc. During an education individuals accumulate human capital, but upon entering the education they do not know how much, as they do not know their aptitude for this education. The accumulation of human capital differs between individuals.
Individuals know the parameters of the probability distribution for the amount of human capital at the end of the schooling period. After leaving school, their amount of human capital is public knowledge.
There is a market for human capital that determines a market clearing price per efficiency unit of human capital for every education (human capital is heterogeneous across educations, homogeneous within educations). The realized wage differential between the two educations is determined by relative supplies of workers with the two educations. A shift from education 2 to education 1 will increase the unit price (wage) in education 2 and reduce the unit price in education 1 (because both educations have declining demand curves for human capital), thus increasing the wage gap. A long-run equilibrium exists if supply is distributed over both educations in such a way that the bid prices from the demand curves generate a wage differential that individuals find exactly compensating for the difference in risk.
So far, we only consider risk due to uncertainty about the output of the schooling process.
In terms of earnings distribution this is an individual fixed effect or permanent risk: human capital produced in school is given for the rest of working life. Now, let's add intertemporal risk. Suppose, for individuals with a given education there is some process of accumulating human capital during working life. Again, within an educational category, human capital is homogeneous. So, the market clearing unit price is determined at the intersection of the total demand curve for human capital of a given type and total supply: number of new graduates multiplied by mean level of human capital produced in school plus number of workers of each experience class multiplied by their level of human capital. Suppose the demand curve is shocked every year: the equilibrium value of a unit of human capital fluctuates randomly over time. Assume the parameters of this process are public knowledge. Then individuals embarking on an education know how much intertemporal variation in earnings they must anticipate. As before, they will take that into account when choosing their education, and only enter when the compensation for risk is sufficient. With 7 a given stock of experienced workers, long-run equilibrium again obtains if the number of entrants leads to supplies that precisely uphold the wage gap requested as risk compensation.
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We can derive the required compensation for risk from imposing equal expected lifetime utility for all educations. For the sake of exposition, we assume that there is one option that has fixed earnings in every year that an individual works. We ignore experience effects for individuals in all options. We will also ignore compensation for postponing earnings when going to school, as this is taken care of in the usual Mincer mark-up.
Consider first the permanent effect from risky human capital production. In the riskless alternative, annual earnings are given as Y f , generating utility U(Y f ), where U( ) is a concave utility function with U' > 0, U" < 0 and U'" > 0 (the latter condition is necessary for declining absolute risk aversion, see Tsiang, 1974 or Hartog and Vijverberg, 2002 
where T is the length of working life and ρ the time discount rate. We can write the lefthand side as
For the stochastic term on the right-hand side we apply a third-order Taylor expansion around the expected value r Y , one order up from Pratt's original contribution (Pratt, 1964) , to ( )
4 Random fluctuation of the demand for human capital is only one way of generating intertemporal earnings risk. Stochastic production of human capital in on-the-job training and job search processes are alternatives. The precise underpinning of intertemporal risk is immaterial for our purpose, all we need is a foreseeable intertemporal earnings risk in an individual's working life. 
where V r is Arrow-Pratt's relative risk aversion and V s is the similar definition for relative skewness affection (we call it affection, because individuals like skewness; see Hartog and Vijverberg, 2002) . With V r and V s positive by definition, we note from (4) that individuals will only enter an education if the permanent effect from unknown human capital production is matched by a positive premium for the risk (variance), while they allow an earnings drop for skewness.
Let's now consider the transitory component of risk. Again, let there be a riskless option,
with earnings fixed at Y f for the rest of working life, and a stochastic option given by
We now take Y r as fixed: it's the initial draw from the earnings distribution that contains the permanent effect discussed above 5 . Applying the same rules as above, we derive we have assumed that individuals only know the parameters of the distributions of human capital production in school and shifts in demand (equilibrium unit prices) over time. groups that allow us to get a representative sample in each education cell.
Cross-section estimation
In this part we estimate the different measures of R and K using the same data set containing the individual's wages used to compute the Mincer earnings equations. Thus, as it is done in McGoldrick (1995), Hartog and Vijverberg (2002) , and Hartog, Plug, DiazSerrano and Vieira (2003) we proceed to calculate R and K by a quite straightforward twostep procedure. We first estimate for each year separately the following cross-section logearnings equation
where the subscripts i and j denote individuals and the education cell where the individual belongs to respectively. Y is gross yearly real earnings measured in DKK. The matrix X contains a set of individual specific variables and d j are dummy variables for each education cell. The variables included in X are years of education, age and age squared. We use age instead of experience because of the exogenous nature of age. The education fixed-effects α j are included in order to control for the effect of omitted variables that may bias our measures of risk and skewness within an education cell. We use the estimated residuals to compute the different measures of R and K. As in McGoldrick (1995) , and Hartog, Plug, Diaz-Serrano, and Vieira (2003) we first consider the following measures for R and K 12 ( )
where e ij is the exponential of the estimated residuals ε ij in equation (7). In (8), R and K are simply estimated as the second and third moment of the distribution of exp(ε j ). In the second step we include estimated values for R and K in the following wage equation
where we expect that π>0 and λ<0. Contrary to equation (7), in equation (9) we do not include dummies for education cells since R and K are already fixed in a given education cell.
The second way to measure R and K we consider is directly taken from Hartog and Vijverberg (2002) . These measures are derived from their theoretical model and are defined by the following expressions
where Y are the individual real gross yearly wages and 2 jê xp 2
In expression (11), ĵ , α β is the estimated parameter vector of equation (7). And 2 ĵ σ is the estimated variance of the random disturbance term in equation (7) calculated over each education cell; with a log-normal distribution, (11) would be an exact expression for the mean.
R
(1) and K (1) are the second and third moment of the exponential of the residuals, whereas R (2) and K (2) are the relative variance and skewness, which fit better to the theoretical values of σ a and κ a relative to the mean, as defined in expression (6) 7 . Although both ways to 7 See Hartog and Vijverberg (2002) for more details on the properties of measures R and K defined in (10).
13 measure R and K use different inputs, they provide similar outcomes. The coefficients of correlation between R (1) and R (2) , and between K (1) and K (2) report values above 0.99 for the whole sample period (see table 5 ). In table 5 we also report their mean and the standard deviation. We remark that in egalitarian Denmark the mean risk and skewness and their variation are quite low compared to those observed in the US 8 . However relative to the means the standard deviations report sufficient variability to search for effects of R and K on wages. Another remarkable fact is the increasing pattern reported by the mean and the standard deviation of R and K throughout the whole sample period; this may be related to the aging of the sample or to secular trends 9 .
Insert table 5
Results on the cross-section estimation of equation (9) for each year using the annual measures of R and K (1984 to 2000) are drawn in Figure 1 . Besides R and K, in equation (9) we also include years of schooling, age, age squared, and dummies for occupation and industry. The patterns shown for R (1) and R (2) , and for K (1) and K (2) are identically shaped, which should not be surprising given the similar distributions and almost perfect correlations between R (1) and R (2) , and between K (1) and K (2) reported in table 5. As the theory predicts, for all years we estimate highly significant effects of both risk and skewness on wages and with the expected signs, except for 1989 when skewness reports a non-significant effect. Thus, the estimates confirm that educations with higher risk in earnings offer higher mean incomes, whereas in those with more positively skewed distributions wages are slightly depressed. Results drawn in Figure 1 are summarized in However, we think that educations differ in inherent, more structural levels of earnings variability, and that individuals tend to respond to the differences of a more long-run nature.
Therefore, we believe that using a unique measure of R and K to estimate the effect of risk and skewness on wages in each separate cross-section is more appropriate, and it can provide more stable results. Thus, taking advantage of our long panel we propose now as alternative measures of R and K their mean values
Hence, we now use the same measure of R and K to estimate their effects on wages in each of our 17 cross-sections. By doing this we smooth possible error in the annual measures, so that we can look for a "cleaner" effect of R and K on wages. Results are drawn in figure 2.
The estimated effects are now more stable than before (note the difference in scales). The gap between the maximum and the minimum risk-premium and skewness-penalty have been reduced drastically relative to the estimates provided by R (1) , R (2) , K
(1) and K (2) . For instance, now using definition (13), in an education cell where R (4) is one unit higher wages rise a maximum around 43% (2000) and the minimum increase observed is around 20% (1987) , reducing the spread between maximum and minimum to about a third of its level using R (2) . An increase in one unit in K (4) causes a maximum depression in wages around 5% (2000) and a minimum around 0.7% (1987), cutting the spread in half. By using R (4) and K (4) the average effect on wages throughout the sample period are 28% and -2.5%, whereas by using R (2) and K (2) these average effects were 44.6% and -6.3% respectively. The intertemporal standard deviation of the risk-premium falls from 0.2 when R (2) is used to 0.05 for
R (4)
. Such a remarkable fall of the dispersion also holds between K (2) and K (4) (see table 6 ).
By applying the measures of R and K defined in (12) and (13) we observe a substantial improvement estimating the risk-premium and the skewness-penalty on wages, since they are more stable and homogeneous throughout time. The standard deviation of R
, R
, K
and K (4) is four times smaller than for R (1) , R
, K (1) and K (2) .
In future work we will dig deeper into the timing effects of compensation for earnings variability. For now, we just observe that the declining effects of R and K in the annual cross-sections may reflect a dominant settlement in early career years: over the sample period, the panel inevitably ages, and the early cross-sections are dominated by relatively inexperienced workers compensated for early earnings variability. The conceptual framework in section 3 pointed to supply reactions of entrants to educations and wage determination (per unit of human capital) when the entrants graduate. A relatively strong effect in early career years is compatible with this model. In later stages of the career other effects may become more important. However, precise testing requires a precise model of cohort and time effects and we will leave that for another occasion.
The empirical results provided in this subsection are in accordance with the previous empirical evidence, thus we add Denmark to the selected list of countries for which the effects of risk and skewness on wages have been tested. However, in contrast to the previous literature, we base our measures of risk and skewness just on education cells, and not on occupations. This is an important improvement, as an education once completed is given and cannot be undone by selective exits as is the case with occupation cells. 11 .Our results are consistent, and at this point we can unambiguously confirm the existence of a compensating wage differentials for schooling risk in Denmark. However, there are still some issues related to the dynamics of earnings shocks and risk compensation that need to be disentangled. We face these issues in the next subsection.
Permanent and transitory shocks in earnings
One of the problems associated with using annual measures on R and K as commonly done in the literature, and as indeed we did in last subsection, is their sensitivity to measurement Hartog and Vijverberg (2002) emphasise the necessity of such a long-term measure to test risk compensation in wages in a more appropriate way.
The residual component u i is the time-invariant individual effect, γ j is the time-invariant education cell effect, and ε it is the time-variant residual effect. To our purpose controlling for heterogeneity across types of education is crucial. On one hand, this term picks up the effect of omitted variables that otherwise would "pollute" ε it , and hence also our measures of R and K on transitory shocks. And on the other hand, by considering γ j we ensure that total within-cell variance (14) we use the unbalanced panel design described in section 4. In order to isolate the time-invariant education effects γ j , we include dummies for each education cell, thus they are added to the set of explanatory variables in X (years of schooling, age and age squared).
Once model (14) is estimated, we compute R and K separately for the exponential of the permanent shocks u i and the transitory shocks ε it , and we include them in earnings equation where in both (16) and (17) (14)- (15). (8) and (10). 14 In the literature we can find some evidence on the variance of the permanent and transitory shocks in earnings by education levels (see e.g. Olson, White and Shefrin, 1979) . However, there is no evidence about these shocks using detailed education types as we do here. Thus, we cannot contrast our results for Denmark extensively with those found in other countries. Alvarez, Browning and Ejrnaes (2003) provide a detailed analysis of patterns of individual earnings residuals in Denmark and find a large amount of individual heterogeneity in parameters for residual structures. Their approach is much too refined for our purpose; and certainly one could not expect compensation for all such heterogeneity.
Estimations on equation (9) estimate risk-premium and skewness affection separately for permanent and transitory shocks, whereas model 3 includes simultaneously R and K of transitory and permanent shocks. We find that in both years 1984 and 2000, our measures of risk and skewness for transitory and permanent shocks in earnings are significant and with the expected signs.
This significance of R and K in both years separated by so wide an interval confirms that our findings are quite stable. Thus, they also confirm that risk is an intrinsic long-run feature of the human capital investments. For instance, taking the results in 2000 for model 1 and 2, we estimate that a one percent increase in risk is associated with 0.06% higher earnings when it comes from permanent shocks, and 0.19% higher earnings when it comes from transitory shocks. The effects of skewness for both types of shocks display a very similar intensity, and depression in wages are around 0.005% for both types of shocks. In model 3, all the effects are also very significant but with a small fall in their intensity, however these latter results have to be taken with caution due to the correlations between see table 13 . 15 The fact that the two types of variability are correlated may be seen as a further indication that the permanent component is not just individual heterogeneity. Why would educations with a high level of individual heterogeneity (e.g. ability) systematically also be characterized by a high level of transitory risk? It is more plausible that the high level of correlation reflects that some educations are affected by both permanent income shocks, for instance the scarring effect of graduating in a recession, and transitory business cycle effects on earnings.
Insert table 13
Our results on compensating wage differentials for schooling risk reveal that permanent variability is less compensated for than transitory shocks. This is consistent with "permanent shocks" containing individual heterogeneity, on which individuals are better informed than the researcher, and which require no compensation. 20
Earnings mobility and transitory risk
Both in this paper and in earlier papers, we have established a premium on wages to compensate for the differential earnings risk associated with different educations. To measure earnings risk, we calculated statistics from earnings function residuals grouped by education. Thus we are vulnerable to the critique that such measures do not adequately measure risk. To meet this critique, we now deal with risk measures based on earnings mobility. We argue that the extent of movement of individuals through the earnings distribution is a good measure of transitory risk. In this subsection we use two different types of earnings mobility measures. The first set is based on earnings time-dependence (coefficient of rank correlation over time), and the second one is based on individual earnings positional movement (quantile mobility ratio and per-capita quantile movement).
Define e it =exp(ε it ), where ε it are the transitory shocks in earnings estimated from equation (14). We compute earnings mobility with a time gap of 5 years, 1985-1990, 1986-1991, and so on. The definition of the selected mobility measures applied over e it are:
A. Rank correlation
We define the coefficient of rank correlation (ρ) as
where the subscript j denotes the education cell the individual belongs to, r ij (t) is the individual's ranking position in the transitory earnings distribution at year t, and r ij (t+5) is the individual's ranking position at year t+5. The rank correlation determines stability , so we take the risk measure 1-ρ j . After calculating the T-5 possible rank correlations for all our sample period we averagethroughout time for each education cell Expression (19) increases with earnings mobility: a higher value represents greater earnings risk, as the ranking in a given year has less predictive power for the ranking five years later.
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B. Positional mobility measures B1. We define the quantile mobility ratio Q k≠l (t,t+5)=1-Q k=l (t,t+5), which is computed from a quantile transition matrix on earnings transitory shocks. It is defined as the fraction of individuals that do not remain in the same quantile of the transitory shocks between period t and t+5. The subscript k is the quantile where the individual is allocated in year t, and l is the same concept for year t+5. This index reflects instability. We also distinguish between upward fluctuations Q k<l (t,t+5) and downward fluctuations Q k>l (t,t+5) , where Once all the transition matrixes have been computed for each education cell we average these indexes throughout time. We use as quantiles the deciles and quartiles.
B2. We define the per capita quantile mobility as
Where Q ij (t) is the quantile of the earnings distribution where the individual is located in year t, and Q ij (t+5) is his quantile location in year t+5. We compute these indices by each education cell and average them over time. We use deciles and the index rises with earnings mobility.
In this subsection we follow the same strategy as before. Once all these movement measures on e ij have been computed for each education cell, we include each of them separately in a Mincer wage equation to test for compensating wage differentials for schooling risk. To compute transition matrixes and intertemporal rankings on e it we use the panel covering the period 1995-1999, whereas to look for risk compensation we use again the first (1984) and last year (2000) of our panel. As we mention above, the mobility and time-dependence measures used here are averaged over time. The results of the augmented Mincer equations are reported in table 14. Besides the earnings mobility measure, the earnings equations also include years of schooling, age, age squared, and dummies for occupation and industry. To make the results comparable we calculate the risk-wage elasticity for each mobility measure. Insert table 14 22 Note first of all that the results for 1984 and 2000 generate the same qualitative conclusions (signs, statistical significance) and that the magnitudes of the coefficients are very comparable. All the measures have the sign that one might expect. The rank correlation, negatively measured, positively associates with risk and requires a positive premium. The immobility measure, i.e. the probability not to move, associates negatively with risk and one expects a negative earnings effect. Downward immobility, measured as the probability not to fall, will be appreciated, and one expects also a negative earnings effect. Upward immobility, measured as the probability not to move upwards, would be appreciated if one solely focuses on earnings variability per se, whether it is up or down, and thus would lead to accepting lower wages. However, the positive sign that we find is intuitively more attractive, and is also more in line with the asymmetry stressed by prospect theory: a higher probability of not moving up is not appreciated and will require some compensation. The per capita mobility measure is a measure of the absolute intensity of movement through the earnings distribution, a direct measure of risk, and thus requiring a positive compensation.
All these results support the hypothesis that individuals dislike earnings risk and that the market provides a compensation for the differential risk associated with different educations. The result on upward immobility suggests that the conceptual framework should be adjusted to allow for the perspective on risk provided by prospect theory rather than by utility maximization.
Conclusions
In this paper we contribute with new empirical evidence to the emerging literature on risk compensation in wages. To do this we use a 17 years panel containing 10% of the Danish population, and with a very detailed description of the educational attainment of the Danes.
The qualities of our data set allow an in-depth analysis of the intrinsic return-risk trade-off associated with schooling choices. Our main contribution relative to the previous literature is to focus on two aspects. First, we base our estimations on compensating wage differentials on risk measures that employ education cells only, whereas the previous evidence also relies on occupation cells. And second, we incorporate an intertemporal dimension to the post-schooling risks. We are able to distinguish transitory and permanent earnings risk. The new dynamic dimension introduced here fills a gap that previous evidence could not cover. We find that both permanent and transitory risk are associated with compensating differentials, but that transitory shocks in earnings are more relevant for compensating wage differentials than the permanent shocks. Encouraged by this latter result and given the dynamic nature of the transitory shocks in earnings, we also experiment with tests of risk compensation using new measures of risk based on individual movements through the residual earnings distribution. Clearly, these new permanent measures based on panel data catch the intrinsic long-run feature of the post-schooling risk and the required compensation for it. Our results are in accordance with what theory predicts.
From our results we can derive some important implications. First, while some previous literature has revealed the important role of the length of education in the risk-return tradeoff, we find that not only the length but also the type of education plays a crucial role in this sense. This horizontal dimension in the schooling choices should be taken into account for a proper research on individuals' curriculum choice, as at given schooling length, differential risk may be an important aspect. Hence, further research in this line is encouraged.
Immediate extensions of our research would be to allow for selective choice of educations and test whether this is as important as many believe, and to allow for the drop-out risk.
There are also many new fields in this area waiting to be ploughed. 
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